Periodic strategies in optimal execution with multiplicative price impact

We study the optimal execution problem with multiplicative price impact in algorithmic trading, when an agent holds an initial position of shares of a financial asset. The interselling decision times are modeled by the arrival times of a Poisson process. The criterion to be optimized consists in maximizing the expected net present value of the gains of the agent, and it is proved that an optimal strategy has a barrier form, depending only on the number of shares left and the level of the asset price.     

The equity impacts of bus rapid transit: A review of the evidence and implications for sustainable transport

The paper offers an analysis of empirical evidence on the equity impacts of operational Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems in the Global South. The focus is on vertical equity, i.e. whether BRT systems achieve progressive benefits for poorer segments of the population. Findings from Africa, Asia, and Latin America all suggest that BRT does offer significant benefits to low-income groups, in terms of travel time and cost savings, access enhancement, and safety and health benefits. However benefits are often skewed toward medium-income users and thus less progressive than they might be. Two primary reasons for this are insufficient spatial coverage and inappropriate fare policies. While many features of BRT potentially allow it to deliver pro-poor outcomes, such outcomes only materialize if BRT implementers pay specific and sustained attention to equity. The paper identifies key issues that need to be addressed to steer BRT implementation toward more socially sustainable outcomes—including better integration with other transit, paratransit, and nonmotorized transport services, and with the housing sector.     

The Effect of Endogenous Regulation on Telecommunications Expansion and Efficiency in Latin America

I examine the effect of reform on telecom performance using a second-generation regulatory framework index and panel data techniques to test how regulatory governance affected sector performance in 22 Latin American countries during the period 1980–1997. Sound regulatory governance in telecommunications has a positive impact on network expansion and efficiency, in both the static and dynamic specifications. Openness of markets to competition and divestment of former state-owned telco operators also contributed positively to better sector performance. The dynamic specification shows that past performance has its own strong effect on present (and perhaps future) performance.     

Equilibrium Investment Strategies and Output Price Behavior: A Real-Options Approach

The effects of competitive interactions on investment decisionsand on the dynamics of the price of a nonstorable commodityare studied in a model of incremental investment with time tobuild and operating flexibility. I find that an increase inuncertainty may encourage firms to increase their capacity.Furthermore, I show that it may be optimal to invest in additionalcapacity during periods in which part of the operational capacityis not being utilized. The impact of competition on the propertiesof the endogenous output price is dramatic. For example, I findthat price volatility may be increasing in the number of competitorsin the industry.     

Neutrality in arrow and other impossibility theorems

Summary. Although not assumed explicitly, we show that neutrality plays an important role in Arrow and other impossibility theorems. Applying it to pivotal voters we produce direct proofs of classical impossibility theorems, including Arrow's, as well as extend some of these theorems. We further explore the role of neutrality showing that it is equivalent to Pareto or reverse Pareto, and to effective dictatorship for non-null social welfare functions satisfying the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives. It is also equivalent to Wilson's Citizens' Sovereignty--which is related to the intuition that symmetry over alternatives makes social preference depend only on citizens' preferences. We show that some of these results are more fundamental than others in that they extend both to infinite societies and to considerably smaller domains of preferences. Finally, as an application of Arrow's theorem, we provide a simple proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.Received: 13 April 2000, Revised: 6 December 2002, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, C70.I thank Salvador Barberá, Luis Corchón, Cesar Martinelli, Eric Maskin, Tomas Sjöström, Ricard Torres, José Pedro Ubeda, and an anonymous referee for feedback. The proofs of Arrow's theorem and two Wilson's theorems come from a note I wrote in 1987 at Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona (Ubeda [16]). In 1996 Geanakoplos [7] wrote a proof of Arrow's theorem similar but not identical to mine. All work in this paper is independent of his.     

New methods of evaluating physical demand at work areas

The manufacturer's requirement of increasing productivity results in the need to design work stations that are increasingly more effective and specialized. However, this procedure can bring about an overloading of the worker, a lack of motivation, and, consequently, a reduction in productivity.Ergonomics adapts the work station to the worker with the object of improving his welfare and satisfaction at his post. One aspect that this science concerns itself with is the evaluation of physical demands connected to productive tasks. Mechanical movements are also studied in order to perform tasks efficiently.We here propose a new method of physical demand analysis that determines the risk factor for muscular skeletal lesion. This method uses, as a base, the system of predetermined times, MTM-UAS. It includes a computer system that allows us to easily analyse the operations at a work station and generates charts similar to those of UAS, but, instead of times, it measures the quantity of mechanical work necessary for each movement.The information that the method provides can be used by different divisions within companies in making decisions about improvements at work stations.     

Testing for Unit Roots with Breaks: Evidence on the Great Crash and the Unit Root Hypothesis Reconsidered

Nelson and Plosser (1982), in a classic paper, failed to find strong evidence against the null hypothesis of a generating process with a unit autoregressive root for thirteen US macroeconomic time series. Perron (1989) claimed that such evidence was available for a majority of these series if the alternative hypothesis was of trend stationarity with a break in 1929. Zivot and Andrews (1992) treated the break date as endogenous, then finding strong evidence agcainst the null for a minority of these series. Our own analysis extends theirs by permitting a break under the null as well as the alternative hypothesis, and allowing for the sequential nature of the testing. Our empirical findings complete the circle. We find no strong evidence against the unit root hypothesis for any of the thirteen Nelson–Plosser series.     

Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets

We study an oligopolistic industry where firms are able to sell in a futures market at infinitely many moments prior to the spot market. A kind of Folk-theorem is established: any outcome between perfect competition and Cournot can be sustained in equilibrium. We then find that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. However, this is not true for the competitive outcome. Furthermore, only the monopolistic outcome is renegotiation-proof if firms can buy and sell in the futures market. These results suggest, contrary to existing literature, that the introduction of futures markets may have an anti-competitive effect.     

The endless need for regulation in telecommunication: An explanation

Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling.     

Dominance Statistics: A Simulation Study on the d Statistic

Quality &; Quantity - Cliff (1993) has proposed the use of a measure of effect size alternative to traditionalmean differences: δ {? = Pr(xi1 &;gt; xj2) - Pr(xi1 &;lt; xj2)}which,...